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With Great(er) Power Comes Great(er) Responsibility:
Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy
ALEXANDRA FLYNN
This article asks how the dialogue surrounding greater municipal autonomy intersects with
Aboriginal rights and title, recognized under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
(Constitution), with a particular focus on Toronto.1 The first part of this article sets out the
ways in which Toronto sought empowerment following the Better Local Government Act
or Bill 5, including judicial consideration of the constitutional role of Canadian
municipalities, the legislative advances made by provincial governments, and the yetimplemented possibilities of protection through a little-used mechanism within the
Constitution. Part II analyzes the obligations of municipalities in respect of Indigenous
Peoples and communities with or without increased authority. I explain the ways in which
municipal governments are introducing legal reforms to improve Indigenous-municipal
relationships, the increasing expectations of municipal consultation with First Nations, and
the direction of Canadian jurisprudence. In the final part of the article, I argue that any
municipalities seeking protection or asserting a role as a democratic government within
the Canadian federal landscape must understand their obligations to Indigenous
communities.

IN AUGUST 2018, MID-WAY THROUGH THE CITY OF TORONTO’S democratic election, the
Province of Ontario enacted the Better Local Government Act (Bill 5), legislation that drastically
reduced the size of City Council.2 The result was a slap in the face to the authority of Canada’s
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largest city, just over a year after Toronto’s City Council had changed the number of electoral
districts following a multi-year ward boundary review process.3 The City of Toronto succeeded in
challenging the newly enacted law at the lower court level. However, the decision was overturned
one year later with a three-two split in favour of the province at the Court of Appeal.4 The lack of
legal clarity has led to a pressing constitutional conundrum, if not crisis, and the Court of Appeal
decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), triggering a long overdue legal
analysis of municipal authority.5 In the meantime, many advocacy groups and politicians have
called for greater protection for municipalities through mechanisms such as a city charter. 6 Other
Canadian provinces, perhaps influenced by the undisciplined Ontario example, have used their
constitutional power to cancel plans for expanded local autonomy.7
Bill 5 and the subsequent legal story have drawn attention to the precarious legal status of
Canadian municipalities. However, within this tale, little mention has been made of the effects of
municipal authority on Indigenous rights. The forgotten narrative of the Indigenous origin of
Toronto and many other Canadian municipalities ignores the legal protections for Indigenous
Peoples under Section 35 of the Constitution, Act 1982 (Constitution).8 The Constitution states
that “Aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed.”9 Many First Nations have treaty and land interests such as reserves, urban reserves, and
fee simple title at the urban scale, both within and adjacent to municipalities, and about half of all
Indigenous Peoples live within cities across Canada.10 There are treaty relationships and
Indigenous claims within and adjacent to cities, but localities often claim uncertainty in regard to
the obligations they owe to First Nations.11 As municipal authority changes, so too will
Indigenous-municipal legal relationships, especially if local governments are constitutionally
protected.12
This article raises urgent attention to Indigenous-municipal legal relationships across
Canada, focusing squarely on Toronto, the target of Bill 5. With their important access to resources
and transportation, most Canadian cities were Indigenous spaces first.13 Toronto sits on land that
hosts a patchwork quilt of overlapping territories that include the Mississaugas of the New Credit,
3

Toronto City Council, Follow-up Report on the Toronto Ward Boundary Review, City Council Decision EX18.2
(Toronto: TCC, 8 November 2016).
4
Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 [Toronto 1].
5
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2019 ONCA 732, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38921 (26 March
2020) [City of Toronto 2020]; Toronto City Council, Legal Challenge to Bill 5, the Better Local Government Act, City
Council Decision CC10.3 (Toronto: TCC, 2 October 2019) [Toronto CC10.3]
6
“A Proposal to Empower and Protect Toronto,” Charter City Toronto, online: <chartercitytoronto.ca>
[perma.cc/TYJ3-CL6Y] [Charter City Toronto].
7
Justin Giovanneti & Carrie Tait, “Mayors of Calgary, Edmonton criticize funding cuts to cities in Alberta budget,”
The Globe & Mail (25 October 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com/canada/alberta/article-alberta-premier-jasonkenneys-budget-cuts-hit-calgary-and-edmonton> [perma.cc/9SZ5-VGT5].
8
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution].
9
Ibid, s 35(1).
10
Mary Jane Norris, Stewart Clatworthy & Evelyn Peters, “The Urbanization of Aboriginal Populations in Canada:
A Half Century in Review” in Evelyn Peters & Christopher Anderson, eds, Indigenous in the City: Contemporary
Identities and Cultural Innovation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) 29.
11
See e.g. Heather Dorries, Rejecting the “False Choice”: Foregrounding Indigenous Sovereignty in Planning Theory
and Practice (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012) [unpublished].
12
Felix Hoehn & Michael Stevens, “Local Governments and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev
971.
13
Victoria Jane Freeman, ‘Toronto Has No History!’ Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism and Historical Memory in
Canada’s Largest City (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010) at 4–5 [unpublished].

the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Treaty 13 Nations, the Wendat, the Petun Nations, and other
Indigenous communities.14 It is subject to the Dish With One Spoon Wampum Belt Covenant, a
treaty agreement between the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and the Ojibwe and allied Nations to
peaceably share and care for the resources around the Great Lakes. The displacement of Indigenous
communities in cities like Toronto is a fundamental and omitted part of the lore of most cities. For
example, the Mississauga tribe of the New Credit received ten shillings for the 250,880 acres of
what became the City of Toronto, yet many history books omit any mention of the treaty or the
sale of the territories, which has become the basis of a land claim.15 Instead, the City places its
origin story at 1834, not the Treaty of Toronto signed in 1787, briefly revoked in 1794, and
reasserted in 1805.16 The many Indigenous spaces and claims that span the geography of what we
call Toronto go well beyond the scope of this article, but are critical in considering the city’s quest
for autonomy.
This article focuses specifically on the implications of increased municipal protection on
Indigenous rights and sovereignty. In this analysis, I draw particular attention to the City of
Toronto, Canada’s largest municipality and the fifth largest government in the country, which is
currently engaged in efforts to assume greater autonomy.17 The first part of this article explains
what we mean when we talk about the empowerment of cities. I set out the constitutional role of
Canadian municipalities, exploring the legal nudges made by the SCC to recognize the democratic
importance of local governments through the development of principles such as subsidiarity and
cooperative federalism within the constraints of section 92(8) of the Constitution. The article
explains how Bill 5 unleashed a series of arguments by applicants, respondents, and intervenors,
and many advocacy efforts aimed at protecting local democracy related to the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and unwritten constitutional principles.18 In the second part of
the article, I outline the effects of a more expansive understanding of municipal authority on
Indigenous Peoples and communities. I draw on the early promise of reimagined Indigenousmunicipal relationships coupled with increasing local obligations to First Nations to argue that any
changes to city power must be prefaced with a clear understanding of a city’s responsibilities to
Indigenous Peoples and communities. I conclude that local governments asserting claims for
recognition and respect both within and outside the existing constitutional fabric must likewise
recognize and uphold their own legal obligations to Indigenous Peoples and communities.

I. WHAT DOES THE EMPOWERMENT OF CITIES MEAN?
The legal story of municipal authority continues to evolve in Canada. In this story, the courts play
a prominent but not decisive role. There are three ways to talk about city empowerment: through
the courts, through legislation, and through a constitutional change.

A. THROUGH THE COURTS
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Under section 92(8) of the Constitution, municipal status and jurisdiction appear unambiguous:
“Municipal institutions” are within the province’s exclusive authority and have no protection
against changes to the design and power imposed on them by provinces. 19 This constitutional
brevity has led municipalities to be called “creatures of the province” with provincial governments
empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot do.20 Based on existing case
law, any constitutional understanding, review of municipal authority, or assessment of municipal
decision-making thus means examining the specific acts undertaken by a municipality and whether
they are acting within their “defined jurisdictional sphere,” with a failure to do so resulting in “the
courts quashing the municipal action as ultra vires, or beyond its legal competence.”21
Although cities are left out of the Constitution as a level of government,22 the interpretation
by the courts of municipal power has evolved considerably over the last twenty years. 23 Cases
concerning municipal authority mostly focus on reviews of municipal decision-making to ask
whether specific acts undertaken by the municipality are ultra vires or within their “defined
jurisdictional sphere.”24 In asking whether decisions were within a locality’s powers, the SCC has
recognized municipalities as representative governments. For example, in Nanaimo (City) v Rascal
Trucking Ltd in 2000, the Court stated that “municipalities balance complex and divergent
interests” in decision-making, thus “warrant[ing] that intra vires decisions of municipalities be
reviewed upon a deferential standard.”25 That same year, the Supreme Court decreed that
“[m]unicipal governments are democratic institutions through which the people of a community
embark upon and structure a life together.”26 In R v Guignard, decided just two years later, the
SCC affirmed that municipal powers “must be given a generous interpretation because their
closeness to the members of the public who live or work on their territory make them more
sensitive to the problems experienced by those individuals.”27
A number of the SCC’s recent decisions also make room for the recognition of
municipalities as a legitimate level of government in the federal structure. In 2007, the SCC firmly
decided in Canadian Western Bank v Alberta that the Constitution must be interpreted through the
lens of “cooperative federalism.”28 Constitutional doctrines are used to balance the overlap of rules
made by governments, reconcile diversity, and ensure sufficient predictability in the operation of
powers.29 The principle of cooperative federalism stands strongly against the previous
interpretation of the federation’s respective jurisdictions as akin to “watertight compartments.”30 It
also incorporates the doctrine of subsidiarity, which serve as an important component in
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Mangat, 2001 SCC 67; OPSEU v Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 SCR 2.

interpreting generously the scope of municipal action.31 Taken together, the pronouncements of
the SCC regarding the proper interpretation to be given to Canadian federalism is consistent with
an important role for municipalities as stewards of the local community.
Despite this seemingly progressive jurisprudence, judges have to date declared that they
will not re-read the Constitution so as to include municipalities as a protected order of
government.32 For example, in East York v Ontario (Attorney General), several municipalities
challenged the Province of Ontario’s decision to create the Toronto megacity in 1998 without the
consent of the amalgamated six municipalities.33 The Superior Court of Ontario concluded that the
unilateral action did not exceed the province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to
municipal institutions in the province. The Court set out four “clear” principles regarding the
constitutional status of Canadian cities:34 (i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status; (ii)
municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial legislation so
provides; (iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are subject
to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and (iv) municipal institutions may exercise only
those powers which are conferred upon them by statute. This decision was upheld by the Ontario
Court of Appeal.35 Likewise, Justice Louis LeBel in 114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Société
d’arrosage v Hudson (Town) in 2001, cautioned thatcourts must assume municipal authority where
none exists.36 This means that the courts have not read section 92(8) or any other section of the
Constitution as displacing provincial governments’ authority over municipalities or protecting
municipalities from provincial interference.
It is squarely within this legal terrain that Bill 5 was enacted. Toronto’s nomination period
for the statutorily scheduled municipal election began on 1 May 2018.37 Thousands of candidates
signed up in the first two months of the race, with a record number of candidates from historically
marginalized communities vying for councillor positions.38 On 7 June 2018, the Conservative
party won a majority of seats in the provincial legislature and Doug Ford, a previous Toronto
councillor, became the premier. Bill 5 passed into law on 14 August 2018 and, as promised,
amended the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (City of Toronto Act) by reducing the size of city council
from forty-seven to twenty-five.39 Several candidates for City Council, mainly women and people
from other historically marginalized communities, challenged Bill 5, as did the City of Toronto
once empowered to do so by City Council, following a tepid response by the city’s mayor.40
On 10 September 2018, Superior Court Justice Edward Belobaba found that Bill 5
“substantially interfered with both the candidates’ and the voters’ right to freedom of expression
as guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” on two
31

Canadian Western Bank, supra note 287 at paras 42–43, 45 (the SCC held that a broad application of the doctrine
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constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect, and paramountcy, and the principle of subsidiarity).
32
Canada Post Corporation v Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767 at para 85.
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Ibid at 797–98.
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SCC 40 at 49 [Spraytech].
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38
City of Toronto et al v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 at para 31 [City of Toronto et al].
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grounds and could not be saved under section 1.41 First, the change in the number of wards midway through the campaign period breached candidates’ freedom of expression.42 Second, using
section 3 to inform the interpretation of section 2(b), the large cut in the size of City Council and
increase in the size of wards violated voters’ freedom of expression rights by making them unable
to “cast a vote that can result in effective representation.”43 In a whirlwind decision, following the
government’s threat that they would invoke the notwithstanding clause to override Justice
Belobaba’s decision, the Court of Appeal granted the Province of Ontario’s request for a stay, with
the result that the election moved forward under a twenty-five ward model.44
Exactly one year later, the Court of Appeal decided in a three-two decision to overturn
Justice Belobaba’s decision on the grounds that the province was constitutionally empowered to
design municipality authority in whatever manner it wished. The majority declared Bill 5 to be
constitutional, with no violations of section 2(b) of the Charter or of unwritten constitutional
principles. They stated that the affair was a “political matter,” and that the Court had “no legitimate
basis” to intervene.45 The majority emphatically rejected combining Charter sections by using
section 3 to inform section 2(b), stating that each Charter right must be unambiguous and “the
content of one right cannot be subsumed by another, or used to inflate its content.” 46 They also
took offense to the use of unwritten constitutional or democratic principles to overturn Bill 5,
stating that even if the Act did violate either such principle, “there would be no legitimate basis
for the court to invalidate” the law.47 The two dissenting judges resolutely disagreed, concluding
that,
[T]he actions taken by Ontario to secure that result left a trail of devastation of basic
democratic principles in its wake. By extinguishing almost half of the city’s existing
wards midway through an active election, Ontario blew up the efforts, aspirations and
campaign materials of hundreds of aspiring candidates, and the reciprocal engagement
of many informed voters. This infringement of s. 2(b) was extensive, profound, and
seemingly without precedent in Canadian history.48
The dissent rested its exposition on section 2(b), not unwritten constitutional principles, as the
basis upon which Bill 5 should be invalidated.
The Court of Appeal’s decision has been appealed to the SCC, with numerous grounds of
appeal possible outside of section 2(b) of the Charter, including unwritten constitutional principles
and the applicability of section 3 of the Charter to municipalities.49 While the SCC could consider
how the notion of municipalities as “creatures of the province” nests with the increasing amount
of deference granted to local governments as democratic bodies, it is more likely that the Court
41
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will focus on the degree to which provinces are constrained from interfering with local elections
or undermining candidates’ and voters’ expectations of freedom of expression during the voting
period. However, even if the Court focuses on Bill 5’s introduction during an election and the
resulting impact on the expression rights of candidates and voters, the SCC is clear that
municipalities are government actors within the Canadian federation. While they may have their
powers limited by provinces, they are considered by courts to be public bodies that serve a
democratic function.50 Overturning Bill 5 on any grounds would only solidify this jurisprudence.

B. THROUGH PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION
Bill 5 was introduced through provincial legislation. The main question that arose in the legal case
that challenged Bill 5 was whether the legislation was valid as a result of its introduction mid-way
through an election. Only one intervenor challenged the legislation on the basis that section 92(8)
should be read as prohibiting the provincial government from enacting Bill 5, noting among other
arguments that, “[l]ocal democracy is older than Canada.”
Immediately after the Norman Conquest, William I granted a Charter to the City of London,
and the City won the right to choose its own Mayor on 9 May 1215. A month later, the Magna
Carta confirmed these rights and granted “that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall
enjoy all their liberties and free customs.” 51 The argument of the intervenor concludes that the
“positive language of 92(8) confirms the place of the municipal council.”52 This argument had
little traction in the Court of Appeal’s majority decision and dissent, consistently with previous
decisions.53 While protection for municipal elections under section 2(b) or section 3 of the Charter
could limit an expansive understanding of provincial power in respect of municipalities and
therefore continue to incrementally advance the recognition of municipal government in Canada’s
federal model, such a decision would not displace the current interpretation of section 92(8) of the
Constitution.
As such, Canada’s largest cities have sought greater autonomy through provincial
legislation itself as a way to overcome provincial involvement in local affairs. Over the last two
decades, and following extensive lobbying efforts, provinces across the country have given more
expansive powers to large municipalities—including more options for raising revenue and greater
oversight in matters such as infrastructure and housing.54 For example, in 2016, the province of
Québec introduced legislation that gave greater autonomy to Québec and Montréal, the latter also
being granted special official status as a metropolis.55 Among other new fiscal and regulatory
See e.g. Pacific National Investment Ltd v Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 64 at para 33 (“Municipal governments are
democratic institutions through which the people of a community embark upon and structure a life together. Even in
this context, however, nobody can challenge the proposition that municipal governments are creatures of the
legislature – a municipal government has only those powers granted to it by provincial legislation”).
51
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See e.g. Municipal Affairs Act, RSO 1990, c M46; Charter of Ville de Montréal, Métropole du Québec, CQLR c C11.4.
55
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50

powers, Montréal gained new authority in housing, heritage preservation, and homelessness and
immigration policy.56
The City of Toronto Act was meant to confer governmental status to Toronto via provincial
legislation. Section 1 of the Act reads: “The City of Toronto exists for the purpose of providing
good government with respect to matters within its jurisdiction, and the city council is a
democratically elected government which is responsible and accountable.”57 As a government, it
has the power to “determine what is in the public interest for the City” and to “respond to the needs
of the City,” as well as a host of other seemingly expansive powers.58 While initially lauded as
evidence of a government-to-government relationship, the City of Toronto Act did not explicitly
prevent the province from overriding Toronto’s final decision on its wards, nor from disrupting a
democratic election.59 Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General) cited the enactment or specific section of
the City of Toronto Act as a reason for overturning Bill 5.60
Moreover, the powers of Canadian municipalities can still be restricted, even in a
seemingly expansive act—for example, the province retained its power to override Toronto’s
decisions—or may be limited by other pieces of provincial legislation.61 Even before Bill 5,
numerous other pieces of legislation already limited the breadth of section 1 of the City of Toronto
Act and the decision-making powers of local governments in Ontario, including the Planning Act,62
the Ontario Municipal Board Act,63 the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act,64 the Municipal
Elections Act, 1996,65 and the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act66
to name a few.
At the end of the day, one needs to look at the full suite of legislation to which
municipalities are subject to understand what they can and cannot do. While provincial
governments could arguably constrain their own power by requiring a two-thirds vote or municipal
agreement to make particular decisions, they remain the level of government in charge of decisionmaking when it comes to municipal authority. This is evidenced in Alberta, where the province
introduced a charter for Calgary and Edmonton, its largest cities, in 2018 after years of
negotiation.67 Calgary’s new city charter contained forty-four new authorities, a new fiscal
framework with cost-sharing and enhanced revenue tools, more requirements for community input,
and a more mature government-to-government relationship between the city and the province.68
After the election of a new provincial government in 2019, these powers were threatened.69 Thus,
Staff writer, “Quebec proposes greater autonomy, grants metropolis status for Montreal,” CBC News (8 December
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even if an Act pertaining to municipal powers is called a “charter” it does not, on its own, acquire
a special status that protects it from interference by subsequent provincial governments. It also
means that provincial governments can delegate responsibilities to municipalities, such as the
procedural duty to consult Indigenous Peoples before making decisions affecting their
constitutional rights, as will be discussed later in this article.

C. THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
A third way of entrenching city power would be by constitutional amendment, for example one
recognizing city charters in the Constitution. This approach would operationalize section 43 of the
Constitution which reads:
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies
to one or more, but not all, provinces, including
(a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, and
(b) any amendment to any provision that relates to the use of English or the
French language within a province,
may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of
Canada only where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons
and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.70
Canada’s formula for amending the Constitution is very restrictive, requiring the consent of
the federal government and the legislatures of seven provinces representing fifty per cent of
Canada’s population.71 However, a single-province amendment only requires the consent of that
province’s legislature and of the House of Commons pursuant to section 43. Such amendments
have only been made a handful of times since the adoption of section 43 in 1982. In 1997,
Newfoundland established a secular school system and Quebec established a language-based
school system. In 1993, New Brunswick added section 16.1 to the Charter, which guarantees equality
rights to the province’s English and French-speaking communities.72
Scholars suggest a great deal of potential for section 43 in providing constitutional
protection to account for local diversity.73 Toronto’s size relative to other Canadian municipalities
arguably provides a basis for a different constitutional status. For example, the United States has
a handful of “home rule” cities; London has special status as the Greater London Authority; and
Mexico City has its own constitution and power akin to a state.74 As Kathy Brock notes,

70

Constitution, supra note 8, s 43.
Ibid, s 38.
72
Dwight Newman, “The Bilateral Amending Formula as a Mechanism for the Entrenchment of Property Rights”
(2013) 21:2 Const Forum 17 at 18.
73
See e.g. ibid at 18; Benoît Pelletier, “Les Modalités de la Modification de la Constitution du Canada” (1999) 33:1
RJT 1 online: <ssl.editionsthemis.com/uploaded/revue/article/rjtvol33num1/pelletier.pdf> [perma.cc/A99X-AQWU];
Kathy Brock, “Diversity Within Unity: Constitutional Amendments Under Section 43” (1997) 20:1 Canadian
Parliamentary Review 23 at 24, online: <revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=62&art=49> [perma.cc/G8S2-ET8G].
74
Valverde & Levi, supra note 20; Harriet Bulkeley et al, “Enhancing Urban Autonomy: Towards a New Political
Project for Cities” (2018) 55:4 Urban Studies 702; Alejandra Reyes, “The Evolution of Local Governance in Mexico
City: Pursuing Autonomy in a Growing Region” IMFG Perspectives Paper (2019), online:
<munkschool.utoronto.ca/imfg/research/doc/?doc_id=514> [perma.cc/6WU9-UJ7T].
71

The internal logic of section 43 provides guidance in that it recognizes two essential
facts about the Canadian constitution and the Canadian confederation compact. First,
it acknowledges a commitment to local autonomy over local affairs …; [t]he second
principle recognized by section 43 is that the needs and aspirations of all the provinces
may vary greatly, and these differences may not be understood by all other
provinces.75
Several prominent political actors at the local, provincial, and federal levels have already
expressed support for the idea of a constitutionally protected City of Toronto. In 2018, former
Mayor John Sewell and journalist Doug Earl began a campaign to introduce a constitutionally
protected charter in Toronto.76 They argued that,
A more equitable relationship, with clearly separated authority, exclusive jurisdictions
for the city, and clear rules on shared jurisdiction, will reduce inter-governmental
friction, streamline decision-making, eliminate duplication, produce tax savings and
clear the decks for partnership and cooperation between Toronto and Ontario on
matters that are truly of mutual interest.77
The charter would be enshrined in the Constitution and would require both federal and provincial
amendment going forward.78 The proposal has been endorsed by a candidate running for a
leadership position with the provincial Liberal party, a city councillor, local media, and a Torontoarea Minister of Parliament.79 Thousands of people have expressed support by attending rallies.80
While the initiative faces hefty political hurdles, if successful, a city charter would remove the
unilateral power of the province to determine the City of Toronto’s authority, and would elevate
the City as a constitutionally protected government.
As cities seek and gain autonomy and power through any of these three means, there are
possibilities of greater protection from provincial interference and more decision-making
autonomy. The initiatives taken over the last two decades, whether through the courts, provinces,
or campaigns for constitutional protection under section 43, demonstrate a steady upward
trajectory in recognizing a distinct legal order for cities. This upward trajectory, I argue, carries
implications and obligations in respect of Indigenous Peoples and communities, as the next section
explains.

II. MUNICIPAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND COMMUNITIES
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As Bill 5 weaves its way through the courts and as advocates clamor for enhanced city power,
there is little discussion of the implications for Indigenous Peoples and communities. Local
governments ought not neglect these implications for two main reasons: first, demands for
municipal empowerment, whether through courts, legislation, or the Constitution, only magnify
the existing legal obligations that local governments have to First Nations; second, the omission
undermines recent local efforts to reimagine municipal-Indigenous relationships.

A. INCREASING MUNICIPAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST
NATIONS
Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations are recognized and affirmed under section 35(1) of
the Constitution and have been given additional meaning through the courts with the duty to
consult and accommodate.81 Although the Constitution recognizes and affirms Aboriginal rights,
barriers to meaningfully exercising those rights is an urgent issue.82 Courts have been a crucial
venue for asserting and advancing Indigenous rights, including by specifying how governments
must engage with First Nations.83
Despite Canada’s nation-to-nation relationship with IndigenousPpeoples—as evidenced by
the very fact that it concluded treaties with them—Canadian history is replete with examples of
what then-Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin of the SCC would eventually call the national
government’s “cultural genocide” towards Indigenous Peoples through the creation of reserves
and residential schools, as well as the erosion of hunting and other rights.84 The Dominion, then
the federal government, has a long history of systematic erosion of Indigenous rights through the
inability of Indigenous peoples to bring lawsuits concerning their rights, and the loss of status of
Indigenous women who married non-Indigenous men, to name just a few examples.85 Moreover,
both the federal and provincial governments have often refused to engage in discussions with
Indigenous communities over treaty violations and Indigenous claims, such that legal actions have
been required to bring them to the negotiating table.86 Until recently, Canada was even among a
small handful of states that refused to bind themselves to the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which, among other things, advances Indigenous rights
to the protection of their ancestral territories and mandates informed consent from Indigenous
communities for developments on their lands.87
One concrete way that Indigenous rights are undermined is through imposed jurisdictional
knotting. John Borrows writes that jurisdictional fracturing is rampant, meaning that federal and
81
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provincial governments impose and apply laws that muddy their respective obligations to First
Nations.88 Scholar Kaitlin Ritchie cautions that the expectation of municipal negotiations with
First Nations may further water down the nation-to-nation relationship that exists between the
federal government and First Nations, further compromising treaty and other relationships.89 The
conundrum that Ritchie describes plays out in deliberations as to whether municipalities in Ontario
have a duty to consult and accommodate. This duty arises when the Crown has knowledge (real or
constructive) of the existence of an Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might
adversely affect it.90 The Crown is understood by the courts to be the federal and/or provincial
governments.91 It holds a non-delegable legal duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous
Peoples in such cases, although it may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to third parties.92
The courts have stated that the goal of the duty to consult and accommodate is to achieve
“reconciliation.”93 However, the term has not been given any specific legal meaning.94 To many
Indigenous Peoples, the vagueness of the aspiration it represents fails to acknowledge the
colonialism that underpins our legal system. Mariana Valverde and Adriel Weaver write that
reconciliation involves a “reconciliation of Canadian (Crown) sovereignty with some collective
rights for [A]boriginal peoples, rights which are sometimes substantive … and sometimes merely
procedural.”95 They state that reconciliation is “purged of its potential to challenge colonial
violence” and is instead “a statement whose logical corollary, apparently, is that the Crown must
act decently not because of international human rights norms but because of its internal, selfimposed honour.”96 As such, the judicial understanding of reconciliation is measured by the Crown
itself rather than in accordance with specific principles, such as those contained in UNDRIP,
making it limited.
The issues of jurisdictional muddling and of what it concretely means to move towards
reconciliation become pronounced in considering the relationships between Indigenous local
communities and settler municipal governments. There are no SCC cases extending the duty to
consult to municipalities.97 The leading appeal court decision, Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon
Arm (City), states that municipalities have no independent constitutional duty to consult First
Nations whose treaty and other interests may be affected by municipal decision-making.98 In this
case, the Neskonlith were unsuccessful in challenging a decision made by the City of Salmon Arm,
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which allowed a permit for development to be issued in a flood plain area located right beside their
reserve. Even though the City of Salmon Arm took steps to consult and accommodate the
Neskonlith, the Court held that the municipality did not owe them a duty to consult, partly on the
basis that municipalities do not have the capacity to properly do so.99 A handful of other lower
court decisions have come to the same conclusion.100
In 2017, however, two decisions of the SCC increased the likelihood that the duty to consult
would be extended to municipalities. First, in Clyde River, the SCC decided that the procedural
aspects of the duty could be delegated to third parties.101 It held that the Crown may rely on
administrative bodies (in this case, the National Energy Board) to satisfy the duty to consult.102
The Court added that the Crown must supplement consultation processes where necessary to
ensure that the duty to consult is adequately discharged.103 An administrative agency may also
assess the adequacy of its consultation process unless their authority to do so is explicitly removed
by statute.104 In such cases, the agency is understood as representing the Crown in regard to
consultation. Felix Hoehn and Michael Stevens advance that—based on Clyde River, on the
evolution of municipal autonomy, and on the fact that third parties have been put into positions
where they are in effect, an arm of the Crown—municipalities should be deemed to hold a duty to
consult and accommodate.105 In any case, across the country, municipalities are expected to
consult, at least procedurally, on matters that affect First Nations. Municipalities already represent
the provincial Crown in municipal planning processes, for example, and provinces effectively rely
on municipalities to discharge this duty.106
Empowered local governments beg the question of a municipal duty to consult and
accommodate specifically, and other obligations more broadly, that cities owe to Indigenous
Peoples and communities.107 Municipalities have a curious place as administrative bodies and sortof governments under Canadian law based on their empowerment under section 92(8) of the
Constitution.108 In Godbout c Longueuil (Ville), questioning whether the Charter applies to
municipalities, Justice Gérard La Forest (with McLachlin CJ and Justice Claire l’Heureux-Dubé
concurring) stated in a concurrent opinion that municipalities can only be described as
“governmental” entities in that, like Parliament and provincial legislatures,
[m]unipical councils are democratically elected by members of the general public and
accountable to their constituents … possess a general taxing power … [and] are
empowered to make laws, to administer them and to enforce them within a defined
territorial jurisdiction. Finally, and most significantly, they derive their existence and
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authority from the provinces. Since the Charter clearly applies to provincial
legislatures and governments, it must apply to entities upon which they confer
governmental powers. Otherwise, provinces could simply avoid the application of
the Charter by devolving powers on municipal bodies. The Charter therefore applies
to municipalities.109
As administrative bodies, municipal governments are tasked with delivering public services.110
Local governments are reviewable based on administrative law principles like any other public
body, meaning that a court can assess whether the entity’s decisions meet fairness standards, and
whether it exceeded its powers. The law determining whether an entity is a public body reviewable
by the courts was summarized in McDonald v Anishinabek Police Service.111 The Ontario Superior
Court held that a court can review an entity’s decision “if the body in question is exercising public
law functions, or if the exercise of its functions have public law consequences.”112 The Court also
cited Masters v Ontario, stating that if a body fulfills a governmental function, “then the body is
part of the machinery of government and is subject to public law.”113 The Charter applies to all
aspects of government, including the legislative, executive, and administrative branches, as well
as municipalities and municipal by-laws.114
In short, since local governments exercise public powers delegated by the province, they
are governmental bodies. Whether or not they are considered part of the Crown in particular
instances, municipalities can and should take their obligations to Indigenous Peoples and
communities seriously. In seeking greater legal and constitutional protection—as it currently does
through its challenge of Bill 5—Toronto should identify how disentangling itself from provincial
oversight would fit alongside section 35 protections, especially given its own stated commitments
to UNDRIP and reconciliation. In favour of increased authority through legal action or
constitutional reform, a city must address its legal obligations to Indigenous Peoples and
communities, described next.

A. CHANGING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AT THE LOCAL SCALE
Indigenous and municipal governments across Canada have been reimagining their relationships
for years, even without a court-recognized duty to consult. Angela D’Elia Decembrini and Shin
Imai pragmatically voice that First Nations and municipalities have a long-standing history of
entering into agreements and generating legislative requirements for municipalities to consult and
accommodate.115 In cities across Canada, there are examples of urban Indigenous agency
cooperation and coordination established to provide better service delivery. In some cities,
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Indigenous-led organizations have statutory mandates in areas such as child welfare and
education.116
On 21 August 2018 Ontario Regional Chief Rose Anne Archibald told municipal leaders
that, “[a]cross Canada, municipal governments and neighbouring First Nations are developing
stronger relationships.”117 These relationships, aimed at “long-term prosperity and peace” are built
through “lasting friendships, relationships and partnerships on the principles of truth and
reconciliation.”118 She stated, “[m]unicipalities, although not original partners to the treaties, are
considered from a First Nations perspective, to be current and valuable partners and certainly
benefactors of the Treaty process.”119
While far from perfect, Toronto has introduced a number of initiatives focused on
relationship-building. For example, over the last ten years, the City of Toronto has increasingly
included Indigenous perspectives in its governance model and started to build relationships with
Indigenous communities.120 There is a broad and diverse range of Indigenous Peoples in Toronto,
many of whom may not have connections to First Nations on whose territories the city was
established and continues to develop. This calls for a different approach from the reserve-based
models most often associated with First Nations governments. The 1996 Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) proposed two possible models of urban Indigenous
governance: greater local political participation through Indigenous representation on political
bodies at the municipal level, and co-managing urban programs and services.121 RCAP also
proposed a “community of interest” model through the establishment of a city-wide politically
representative body. Indigenous communities in Toronto are moving towards both approaches,
according to the report of the Toronto Aboriginal Research Project.122 Indigenous community
agencies are participating formally in local government through their representation on the City’s
Indigenous Affairs Committee, which is presently working towards the development of a larger
urban Indigenous framework.
In 2010, the City affirmed recognition and respect for the unique status and cultural
diversity of Indigenous communities in Toronto, including recognition of their inherent rights
under the Constitution.123 In 2014, Toronto’s City Council endorsed the 94 Calls to Action from
Yale D Belanger, “Breaching Reserve Boundaries: Canada v Misquadis and the Legal Creation of the Urban
Aboriginal Community” in Evelyn Peters & Christopher Anderson, eds, Indigenous in the City: Contemporary
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the TRC Report and requested the development of concrete actions by staff to fully implement the
calls to action explicitly relating to the role of municipal governments.124 These measures included
the adoption of cultural competency training for the Toronto civil service, a ten-year capital project
to incorporate Indigenous place-making in Toronto parks, and a roadmap and report card regarding
the implementation of plaques to commemorate Indigenous places. In addition, City Council has
adopted an ongoing ceremony at its meetings and approved a public campaign to educate residents
on the Year of Truth and Reconciliation Proclamation.125
The City of Toronto made important strides by adopting UNDRIP in 2013.126 UNDRIP is
widely seen by Indigenous activists, scholars, and lawyers as a best practice in considering
Indigenous-settler relationships.127 Toronto’s UNDRIP-related actions are noteworthy for two
reasons. First, UNDRIP’s recognition of Indigenous rights goes well beyond the threshold
established in Canadian law regarding the duty to consult. The standard it sets concerning free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC) entails not merely an Indigenous right to be consulted with
regard to project proposals, but the right to effectively veto projects that cannot be reconciled with
Indigenous values or interests. While the City of Toronto has not specifically set out how and when
FPIC applies to project assessments, the adoption of UNDRIP still signals the City’s desire to build
respectful and reciprocal relationships with Indigenous communities. Second, following the
release of the TRC report, the City of Toronto acknowledged Article 11 of UNDRIP.128
Importantly, the City noted “staff’s legal duty to consult,” particularly in relation to environmental
assessments and heritage.129 The City has taken an important step by imposing this obligation on
itself.
Toronto, like a number of other municipalities in Ontario and elsewhere, has created an
Indigenous Affairs Office meant to oversee place-based relationship building with Indigenous
communities.130 The Indigenous Affairs Office will help guide the municipal government in its
relationships with Indigenous Peoples, including urban Indigenous communities, neighbouring
First Nations and Métis Nations in Ontario, and Indigenous organizations.131 This starts to build a
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corporate knowledge and awareness of the important relationships that are to be cared for by the
City. As the city deepens its self-awareness, it will begin to polish the links of its relationships
with Indigenous Peoples and will be able to work better with Indigenous Peoples, organizations,
and nations in order to implement the principles of UNDRIP and FPIC.
The early promise of reimagined Indigenous-municipal relationships coupled with
developments in jurisprudence mean that any changes to city power must be prefaced with a clear
understanding of the effects on Indigenous Peoples and communities. Campaigns for greater legal
protection for local governments must recognize Aboriginal and treaty rights. Cities must
acknowledge how their quests for greater power nests with their responsibilities to First Nations
and Indigenous Peoples.

III. CONCLUSION: NO CITY POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY
This article queried how the dialogue surrounding greater municipal autonomy intersects with
Indigenous rights, with a particular focus on Toronto. The first part of the article set out the ways
in which Toronto sought empowerment following Bill 5. This included a discussion of the
constitutional role of Canadian municipalities, the advances made by courts and provincial
governments, and the yet-to-be implemented possibilities of protection through a little-used
mechanism of the Constitution. The following section analyzed the obligations of municipalities
in respect of Indigenous Peoples and communities with or without increased authority. I explained
the ways in which municipal governments are introducing legal reforms to improve Indigenousmunicipal relationships, the increasing expectations of municipal consultation with First Nations,
and the direction of Canadian jurisprudence. Overall, this reflection drives toward the conclusion
that municipalities seeking protection or asserting their roles as democratic governments within
the Canadian federal landscape must understand their obligations to Indigenous Peoples and
communities. In seeking greater power, cities must acknowledge their responsibilities.

